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Abstract
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with quality ladders where consumers
heterogeneity is assumed and is modelled through non homothetic preferences. We show that in
such a model, unlike mainstream quality ladders models, the steady state equilibrium is
characterised by a duopoly were the state of the art technology and the one immediately below it
are both able to survive and thrive, under given conditions for the income distribution. In the
words of Schumpeter, this model delivers only partial creative destruction. Furthermore, we
show that under duopoly, an increase in the degree of income inequality, raises the intensity of
research activities and the growth rate of the economy. 
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1 Introduction
The endogenous growth literature can by now be defined as abundant. More than a decade has
passed since the seminal works of Romer, in which for the first time those who engaged in
innovative activities with the goal of fostering technological change, were formally modeled
(informally, Schumpeter had talked about this long before), as enjoying a degree of market
power (Romer, 1990). Thereby, technological change and growth could be determined
endogenously as the result of rational decisions taken by economic agents in pursuit of profit
incentives.
In the years that followed there were other important contributions, the two most seminal
probably being Grossman et al. (1991) and Aghion et al.(1992), These studies split the field of
endogenous growth into two branches, with one preoccupying itself with introducing
technological change through growth in the number of goods produced (horizontal
differentiation), and another which preferred to introduce technological change through quality
improvements in production (vertical differentiation, also known as quality ladders). Even the
latter stream soon became quite abundant, as the initial studies by Grossman et al. (1991) and
Aghion et al.(1992) were followed by many others that tried to use the conceptual framework
provided by the quality ladder models to broaden their scope to the study of open economies,
trade, foreign direct investment, developed versus developing countries and so on (see Aghion et
al., 1998, for an account). The mainstream models with quality ladders all predicted total
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obsolescence, or, in the parlance first introduced by Schumpeter, total creative destruction. Put
simply, these models predicted that an innovation in the quality goods sector would force lower
quality goods out of the market by bringing their sales down to zero. As a result, in these models,
the quality goods sector featured a monopoly of the good that embodied the highest quality on
the ladder. 
However, in the real world there are many examples of markets for quality goods with
duopolistic or oligopolistic market structure. Examples include video and radio cassettes vs.
digital video disks and compact disks, various generations of computer processors (Pentium II,
III, IV, Celeron, etc.) and so on. Perhaps the most telling example is a comparison of the car
market in developed vs. developing countries. The former is typically characterized by a
monopoly of the latest models, while in the latter one can often see several generations of cars
being produced alongside each other and all making a profit. A well known example is the
Volkswagen Beetle. While production of this model ceased many years ago in most developed
countries, it continued being produced in several developing economies. For instance, production
of the Beetle has been continued until very recently in Mexico, and in any case for much longer
than in Europe or the U.S. A possible explanation for these phenomena may lie in the different
way income is distributed across markets or countries. The main stream models by Grossman et
al. (1991) and Aghion et al.(1992) cannot account for income distribution differences.
In Aghion et al.(1992), the consumption good is produced by inputting intermediate
goods according to the Cobb Douglas production function: . This is a homotheticY = Ax?,? < 1
specification which implies that the rate of substitution between inputs does not change with
income.
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In Grossman et al. (1991), household utility is of the form  , where  islnDt = ln ?m qmxm D
a consumption index, and  is an index for quality. Thus products along the quality ladder areq
perfect substitutes and there is positive demand only for the product that carries the lowest price
per unit of quality, which is the highest product on the quality ladder. Again, that occurs
regardless of the level of income. 
In order to introduce differences in income distributions into the quality ladder
framework, we employ the conceptual apparatus produced by that particular branch of industrial
organization known as vertical quality differentiation literature. Among the most important
contributions to this literature, we cite Gabszewicz et al.(1979), and Shaked et al.(1982).  These
studies model preferences as follows: , where I is income, qi is a quality index,u(I, qi) = qi(I − pi)
and pi is the price of a good of quality i. Thus consumers problem is not how much to buy of
some good (as in Aghion et al., 1992. and in Grossman et al., 1991) But whether to buy one unit
of the good, and which quality to buy. 
The one feature of the standard quality ladders literature that we do keep, is the so called
leapfrogging assumption. By this assumption, the firm that innovates is always an outsider that,
by innovating, succeeds in going one step higher on the ladder than the current incumbent (it
"leapfrogs" the incumbent). A newer strand of the quality ladders literature works on the
different assumption that an outsider innovator must first catch up with the incumbent firm and
then, when both firms are level, any of them can make the jump forward on the quality ladder by
further innovating. This is the so called "neck-and-neck competition" assumption3. Aghion et al.
(2005), use the neck-and-neck setting to come closer to our study by analyzing the relationship
between the degree of competition in product markets and the rate of innovative activity. As will
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3 The quality ladder literature with neck-and-neck competition starts with Aghion et al. (1997).
become clear presently through the detailed description of our model, the latter relationship
constitutes part of the channel of transmission through which differences in the income
distribution affect the rate of innovative activity. However, the link between different income
distributions and the degree of competition in product markets can only be made through the
adoption of non-homothetic consumer preferences, as those first introduced in the vertical
quality differentiation literature.
Non-homothetic consumer preferences such as those just described above, have been
employed in the context of a quality ladder model by two other scholars, Li (2003) and
Zweimuller et al. (1998, 2005). In the quality ladder literature these are the studies that come
closest to the model developed here, but there are some important differences too that distinguish
them from the present study. 
In Li (2003), income inequality is introduced through assuming that labor income has a
uniform distribution with mean preserving spread. This assumption simplifies somewhat the
analysis, but it does not allow for a comparison of countries that feature very different mean
incomes. Hence, it does not allow for a comparison of the developed world vs. the developing
world. 
In Zweimuller et al. (1998, 2005), labor income is assumed to be the same across
individuals, while income inequality is introduced through heterogeneity in “other wealth”,
which is endogenous, and whose source is the stake that each individual owns in the firms that
produce the quality goods. They too make a simplifying assumption, so that consumers are
divided into two categories, the rich and the poor, according to a discrete distribution of other
wealth. While we accept that a uniform distribution may fail to give an accurate distribution of
income in the real world, we nevertheless feel that it is worthwhile to maintain this assumption,
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in order not to lose the rich framework provided by the vertical quality differentiation literature.
Crucially, this difference in assumptions leads us to findings that, under duopoly, are the
opposite of those of Zweimuller et al. (1998, 2005). In our model, unlike theirs, an increase in
income inequality has a positive effect on the rate of research activity and ultimately the growth
rate of the economy. Across different market structures, our model predicts, similarly to Li
(2003), a U-shaped relationship between inequality and growth, which is negative under
monopoly but, as will be amply discussed, turns positive under duopoly. By contrast, Zweimuller
et al. (1998, 2005) predict that more inequality is harmful for growth both in a pooling and in a
separating equilibrium.
In this study, income inequality is introduced through other wealth which originates from
having a stake in the firms that produce the quality goods, like in Zweimuller et al. (1998, 2005).
This other wealth is assumed to be uniformly distributed, but without the restrictive mean
preserving spread assumption. We also perform some comparative statics on the steady state
relationship between inequality, wages and the market structure, as described by the number of
qualities, and we give a simple numerical example, to show how the degree of inequality or the
size of the technological leap may affect the wealth level and the rate of innovative activity.  
Worth mentioning at this point is the fact that technological progress, in its relative
novelty, is not the only conceivable channel of transmission in the link between income
inequality and growth. The more widely accepted idea has been that income inequality affects
growth through physical and human capital accumulation. For instance, Galor et al. (2004) in a
recent study, reckon that inequality has long been an important determinant of growth. But they
argue that over time the channel through which inequality affected growth has changed. In the
early stages of industrialization, inequality was thought to be a positive determinant of growth,
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because physical capital accumulation, in its growth-fostering role, needed a more concentrated,
that is unequal, distribution of income to gain sufficient momentum. Later on, as human capital
accumulation replaced physical capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth, its
characteristic of being embodied in humans implied that in order to display its full potential,
human capital accumulation should be widely spread across individuals in society. This time
therefore, higher income inequality would be harmful to growth because it would hinder, or at
least slow down, such a spread. Galor and Moav attempted to provide a unifying theoretical
framework that could reconcile these two effects. However it is interesting to notice that they
made no mention of the possibility of existence for a third channel through which inequality
could affect growth: technical change.
Another recent addition to the literature that studies the interaction between inequality
and growth via demand side effects is Mani (2001). This author too, in order to have income
inequality play a role, assumes non-homotheticity when modeling consumers’ preferences.
However, Mani (2001) focuses entirely on the relationship between income distributions and
demand patterns and his model, unlike our study, features no technological progress.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays down the model, introduces
income heterogeneity and describes the features of the market structures of monopoly and
duopoly. Sections 3 to 5 introduce the remaining main building blocks of this model, namely the
research and development sector (in short RnD), the labor markets, and how the growth rate of
the economy is being computed. Sections 6 and 7 perform steady state equilibrium analysis in
monopoly and duopoly respectively. Sections 8 and 9 contain the comparative statics and the
numerical example mentioned above. Section 10 comprises the conclusion and some directions
for future research. The Appendix has all the remaining mathematical details.
7
2 The Model
The economy is populated by L individuals, whose life-span is infinite. The representative
individual consumes two types of goods each period. The first type is a good that is subject to
quality innovation over time. Each individual consumes at most one unit per period of these
goods. The quality good is denoted as  where t indexes time, and i=1,2 indexes quality, inqit
ascending order. An innovation raises the quality of good  by a constant factor .qit ? > 1
Therefore  denotes the product that sits second from top on the quality ladder, and q1 = ?
 denotes the good that occupies the highest position on the ladder. The second typeq2 = ?q1 = ?2
of good is a homogeneous product, that can be thought of as a composite commodity that
comprises all other purchases made beyond the quality goods sector. Let this homogeneous good
be denoted by  (again t indexes time). In any period t, the utility achieved by the representativeht
individual is given by:
(1)ut = qitht
 
In words,  this utility function says that the representative individual can buy only one
unit of the quality good and an amount  of the homogeneous good. This individual’s choiceh
concerns which quality to buy, as represented by the quality index  , and how much to have ofqit
the homogeneous good. We take advantage of a utility functions’ property by which these are
only defined up to a monotonic transformation, to rewrite the above utility in logs as follows:
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(2)lnut = lnqit + lnht
The intertemporal utility maximization problem for the representative individual is:
(3)Max ?
t=0
∞ 1
1 + ?
t
ln ut
where  is the rate of time preference.?
We assume that consumers are endowed with assets k, earn a wage w from supplying one
unit of labor, and make expenditures C on the two types of goods defined above. Over time, in
any given period, assets next period must be equal to the sum of the assets, augmented at the
current interest rate, and the wage income earned from working this period, minus consumption
expenditure this period, according to the following budget constraint:
(4)kt+1 = (1 + rt)kt + wt − Ct
Since consumers purchase one unit of the quality good and spend the rest on the
homogeneous good, demand for the latter is given by:
(5)ht = Ct − pit
where  is price in period t of one unit of good of quality i = 1,2.pit
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Having stated what the representative individual’s intertemporal problem is, we will
restrict our attention to the steady state, utility-maximizing, consumption pattern of such an
individual4, which is:
. (6)C = w + ?k
2.1 Introducing Income Heterogeneity
In order to introduce income heterogeneity, we shall assume that w, wage income, is the same
for everybody who supplies one unit of labor and exogenous, whereas assets k, which we will
henceforth refer to as “wealth” (other than wage income), is uniformly distributed on a support 
. [kl, ku]
We further define:   as the mean other wealth (per capita), a measure of thevL =
ku + kl
2
position of the distribution concerning other wealth, and   as a measure of the spreadxL =
ku − kl
2
of the distribution. Given the linear relationship between other wealth and steady state
consumption, the latter is also uniformly distributed on support  . These assumptions[Cl, Cu ]
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4 In order to solve for the steady state, we write down the Bellman equation for this problem:
 , subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:V(kt−1 ) = maxCt,kt ut(Ct) +
1
1 + ?V(kt)
 . We recall that  . Substituting from the budgetCt = −kt+1 + (1 + rt)kt + wt ut(Ct) = ln(Ct − pit) + lnqit
constraint into the Bellman equation, we can rewrite the latter as follows:  .V(kt−1 ) = maxkt ut(kt) +
1
1 + ?V(kt)
The Euler equation is: . Here: ut
∏ = 11 + ? ut+1
∏ f ∏(kt)
. In steady state we set  and
1 + rt
Ct − pit =
1
1 + ?
1 + rt+1
Ct+1 − pit+1 (1 + rt) w
Ct+1 − pit+1
Ct − pit =
1 + rt+1
1 + ? Ct+1 = Ct = C
  to derive:   . Steady state can be arrived at by setting pit+1 = pit = pi 1 = 1 + rt+11 + ? u rt = r = ?
  in the budget constraint, to get: ..kt = k, Ct = C, wt = w, rt = ? k = (1 + ?)k + w − CwC = w + ?k
imply that individuals have same preferences and wage income, but differ in their other wealth
and, as a result, in their levels of consumption. The consumption pattern of individual j c [l, ..., u]
is thus given by  , and the mean consumption pattern, as a case of special interest, isCj = w + ?kj
given by: .Cm = w + ? vL
2.2 Bertrand Duopoly Game
Each individual on the wealth scale makes a decision regarding the purchase of the quality good,
namely whether to buy it, and which quality to buy. This decision depends on the income of the
individual in question and, again because of the linear relationship between income and
consumption, on the level of consumption that this individual can afford. Let  denote theCeq
consumption level of the individual who is indifferent between purchasing one unit of good 1 at
price  and one unit of good 2 at price . For such an individual, utility derived from these twop1 p2
consumption patterns must be the same:
(7)ln u(q1) = ln u(q2) w ln q1 + ln(Ceq − p1) = ln q2 + ln(Ceq − p2)
Solving for  yields:Ceq
(8)Ceq = q2p2 − q1p1q2 − q1 =
?p2 − p1
? − 1
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The individual with consumption pattern  divides the population into two groups.Ceq
There are individuals  who buy good 1, and individuals   who buyCj c Cl, Ceq Cj c Ceq, Cu
good 2.5
Therefore, demand for goods 1 and 2 is respectively:
(9)D1 = LF(Ceq)
(10)D2 = L(1 − F(Ceq))
Where  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of consumption levels, which has densityF($)
 . Under duopoly, firms compete for customers by choosing prices (Bertrand competition).f($)
Their objective is to maximize the following profits:
(11)?1 = D1(p1 − wc) = LF(Ceq)(p1 − wc)
(12)?2 = D2(p2 − wc) = L(1 − F(Ceq))(p2 − wc)
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5  Underlying this statement, there is an assumption that the market is “covered”, that is, everybody buys the quality
good, although some people prefer good 1 and some others buy good 2. Another equilibrium scenario, which is
ruled out here, is when some consumers prefer not to buy the quality good at all. In this instance, we say that the
market is not covered. It is not difficult to show that, in order for the market to be covered, the following condition
must hold: . The following is an interpretation of this condition: The equilibriumCeq [ 2Cl − 1? − 1 wc
household, which is indifferent from buying good 1 at price and good 2 at price , must have consumption thatp1 p2
is less than twice the consumption of the poorest household minus a weighted marginal cost, where the weight 
is a measure of the quality differential between good 1 and good 2.1? − 1
where  is profit accruing to firm producing good of quality   and selling it at price  ?i i = 1, 2 pi
and wc is a cost per unit produced (assumed to be the same for both qualities, and equal to wage
income multiplied by a labor coefficient c<1).
We can use first order conditions for profit maximization ( ) to derive theØ?i
Øpi = 0
following two equilibrium conditions:
(13)1 − 2F(Ceq) = f(Ceq)(Ceq − wc)
(14)f(Ceq) Beq − wc(? + 1)? − 1 = 1
where we define   . Further manipulations yield the equilibrium prices:Beq = ?p2 + p1? − 1
(15)
p1e = (? − 1) F(Ceq)f(Ceq) + wc
p2e = ? − 1?
1 − F(Ceq)
f(Ceq) + wc
And equilibrium profits:
(16)
?1e = (? − 1) L F(Ceq)
2
f(Ceq)
?2e = ? − 1?
L 1 − F(Ceq) 2
f(Ceq)
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This formulation of equilibrium relationships offers the advantage of being valid for any
distribution of consumption patterns, not just the uniform case.
This consideration enables us to state the following lemma for any distribution of
consumption levels:
Lemma: In a duopolistic market where everybody buys one of the two quality goods, the
following is always true:
(17)F(Ceq) [ 12 w Ceq [ Cm
Proof: Recall that one of the two equilibrium conditions is:
(18)1 − 2F(Ceq) = f(Ceq)(Ceq − wc)
Notice that the RHS of this condition is  by definition, so too must be the LHS. But thism 0
implies:  .F(Ceq) [ 12
From this point onwards, we shall restrict ourselves to the uniform distribution case. For
later use, we rewrite equilibrium profits as a function of mean other wealth v and spread x, as
follows:
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. (19)
?1e(v) = (? − 1)?
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3?
2
2x
?2e(v) = ? − 1? ?
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
2
2x
2.3 Monopoly
Here we want to describe the conditions that in equilibrium yield a monopoly, that is that market
structure, where the quality good sector is characterized by everybody buying the
state-of-the-art. Moreover, just as we did when discussing duopoly, we want to determine the
monopoly equilibrium price and profit that accrues to the firm which produces the
state-of-the-art.
We start by writing the demand schedule facing the firm selling good 2:
(20)D2 = L ¶Ceq
Cu f(C)dC = LCu − CL (Cu − Ceq) =
L
Cu − Cl Cu −
?
? − 1 p2 + 1? − 1 p1
If both firm producing good 1 and firm producing good 2 were to adopt marginal cost
pricing ( so that p1 = wc and p2 = wc), output would be:   . A monopolist facingLCu−Cl (Cu − wc)
the above mentioned demand schedule, which is linear in p2, would therefore choose output that
is half of that chosen when both firms adopt marginal cost pricing:   . BecauseLCu−Cl (Cu − wc)÷2
every individual buys at most one unit of the quality good, monopoly occurs whenever the size
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of the population is not greater than the number of units produced by a profit-maximizing
monopolist, or in symbols:
(21)L [ LCu−Cl (Cu − wc)÷2 wCu [ 2Cl − wc
We can rewrite the above condition in terms of mean other wealth v and spread x, as
follows:
(22)x [ 13 v + wL(1 − c)?
.
The economic interpretation of this condition is that for monopoly to obtain in
equilibrium, the spread in the distribution of other wealth, cannot exceed one third of the
expression in brackets. The latter is the sum of wealth v and the discounted flow (discounted at
the rate of time preference ρ ) of the total amount of salaries wL earned in sectors other than
manufacturing of the quality good (this exclusion is obtained by multiplying wL by the
coefficient 1-c). Salaries in the manufacturing of quality goods sector are excluded because they
also represent a cost for households/entrepreneurs. The condition for monopoly can therefore be
restated in words as: “the spread in wealth must be at most equal to one third of the total wealth
in the system”6. Under these circumstances the market for the quality good is a monopoly. The
profit accruing to the monopolist is: . In order to maximize this profit, the?M = L(pM − wc)
monopolist will set the maximum price compatible with a monopolist market structure. This
amounts to setting the highest price such that  . Recall that under monopoly, the firmCeq [ Cl
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6  Obviously, the condition for duopoly is the complement of this and reads “duopoly obtains as soon as the spread
in other wealth is larger than one third of the total wealth in the system”.
producing the inferior good is assumed to set a price equal to marginal cost,    whichp1 = wc
yields no profit so that the firm does not start production in the first place. As a result, the above
inequality may be rewritten as:   .  To get the price that maximizes monopoly
?pm − wc
? − 1 [ Cl
profits, notice that the above constraint is binding and solve for  to obtain:pM
 (23)pMe = ? − 1? Cl + wc?
Putting this price back into the expression for profit, yields equilibrium profit under
monopoly:
 (24)?Me = L ? − 1? (Cl − wc)
Both monopoly equilibrium price and profit depend on  only. Thus these relationshipsCl
are valid for any distribution of consumption patterns. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a
parallel with the duopoly case, we shall restrict our analysis to the uniform distribution case. 
For later use, we rewrite monopoly price and profit as function of mean other wealth v and
spread x:
(25)
pMe = ? − 1? w + ?( vL − xL ) + wc?
?Me = ? − 1? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
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3 The RnD Sector
In order to close the model, and before passing to the description of steady states with associated
equilibrium analyses, we need to introduce two more elements. 
In this section we describe the RnD sector, while the next section is dedicated to the labor
markets. Both these sectors are crucial building blocks of this model, but, because here nothing
novel is added to them that did not appear in the previous quality ladders literature, we provide a
concise account of them, and refer the interested reader to that literature  (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1991) for a more detailed description.
We assume that innovations are random and arrive according to a Poisson arrival rate µ.
µdt describes the probability that the next innovation occurs within dt from now, when the
innovator research effort is µ. In steady state, the value of an innovation V will be such that the
following arbitrage equation holds:
(26)?V = ?2 − ?V + ?Vn
In turn:
(27)?Vn = ?1 − ?Vn
where  is the value of the innovation next period, after it has become second best due to theVn
arrival on the market of a better product (i.e. after it has been pushed one step lower on the
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quality ladder);  is profit for the firm producing good of quality , and  is the rate of?i i = 1, 2 ?
time preference.
After substitution, we get the asset arbitrage equation:
(28)V = ?2? + ? + ??1(? + ?)2
Free entry in RnD implies zero profit for the innovator, or:
 (29)?V −?wa = 0
where  is the cost of doing research, whose components are the intensity of research , wage?wa ?
income w, and a labor coefficient a. We can and rewrite this free entry condition as follows:
(30)?(V − wa) = 0
and conclude that positive but finite research investments can take place only when V = wa. In
symbols:
 
(31)V = wa,? > 0
V < wa,? = 0
Putting together the asset arbitrage and free entry conditions yield the following
equilibrium relationship for the RnD sector:
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(32)wa = ?2? + ? + ??1(? + ?)2
When wealth and consumption distributions are such that, in equilibrium, the market
structure is a monopoly, sales of the good of lower quality are zero and . As a result, next?1 = 0
period value is  and the RnD condition (32) reduces to:Vn = 0
(33)wa = ?m? + ?
4 The Labor Market
The final element of this model is the labor market. In this market, total demand is the sum of
demand for labor in each sector. With research intensity µ and a research sector characterized by
a labor coefficient a, demand for labor in research is equal to aµ . In the manufacturing sector,
the demand for labor in manufacturing the quality good is cL. Demand for labor in
manufacturing the homogeneous good is  , and it is obtained as follows: The technology for thehw
homogeneous good is assumed to be such that every individual contributes equally to its
production. Given perfect competitive settings, we equate marginal product of labor   to thehL
going wage w, which, upon solving for L, yields  the demand for labor in manufacturing the
homogeneous good as stated above. The supply of Labor is simply given by L.
Equating labor demand and labor supply, yields the full employment condition:
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 (34)a? + cL + hw = L
Equation (34), as it stands, does not yet have any relationship with the (uniform)
distribution of wealth. In order to have the latter play a role in equation (34), several further
arrangements are necessary. We work through the case of monopoly in great detail, and only
sketch the main passages for duopoly, because the calculations involved follow the same logic.
We start by recalling that demand for the homogeneous good h under monopoly is given by 
 , and that    is characterized by a uniform distribution on support  .h = C − pM C [Cl, Cu ]
Therefore, we can express  as follows7:h
(35)h = ¶Cl
Cu L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC = ¶Cl
Cu L
Cu − Cl (C − pM)dC = L
Cu + Cl
2 − pM
Replace this expression for  into equation (4.1) and recall that   is theh Cu + Cl2 = Cm
mean consumption, to end up with the following rearranged full employment condition:
(36)a? + LCmw + cL − LpMw = L
The next step is to replace  with (23) to get :pm
(37)a? + LCmw + cL −
L
? − 1
? Cl + wc?
w = L
21
7 The further passages that were omitted in the main text are as follows:
  ; h = ¶ClCu LCu−Cl (C − pM )dC = LCu−Cl ¶ClCu CdC − pM ¶ClCu dC = LCu−Cl
Cu2−Cl2
2 − pM(Cu − Cl )
Then, canceling terms yields the result of the main text.
Further algebra yields the following:
(38)a? + LCmw −
L
? − 1
? (Cl − wc)
w = L
Finally, recognition that  is nothing but (2.24), enables us toL
? − 1
? (Cl − wc) = ?M
express the full employment condition as a function of monopoly profits, as follows:
(39)a? + LCmw − ?Mw = L
In the duopoly case, the relationship between  and  must account for the fact that nowh C
the uniform distribution of  is split into two portions by the indifferent consumer, characterizedC
by consumption pattern . Hence, we can derive the following expression for h:Ceq
(40)
h = ¶Cl
Ceq L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC + ¶Ceq
Cu L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC
h = ¶Cl
Ceq L
Cu − Cl (C − p1 )dC + ¶Ceq
Cu L
Cu − Cl (C − p2 )dC
After following the same procedure as for monopoly, replace the above in the full
employment condition, so that the latter can be rewritten in terms of firms’ profits:
(41)a? + LCmw − ?2w − ?1w = L
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5 Growth Rate
The steady state growth rate of this economy stems from the quality upgrading process in the
quality goods sector. As in the earlier quality ladders literature, we recall that innovations arrive
at Poisson rate µ, and when they do arrive, the size of the jump up the quality ladder is    , toln?
derive the following expression for the steady state growth rate:
(42)g = ? ln?
6 Steady State Analysis - Monopoly
In steady state equilibrium, the model is fully described by the research equation (32) and the
full employment condition (34). Under monopoly,  these equations take the following form:
(43)wa = ?M(v)? + ?
(44)w?a = ?M(v) − ?v
Monopoly profit, as a function of wealth v, has in turn been found to be:
(45)?m(v) = ? − 1? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
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After plugging the profit equation into equations (43) and (44), we get a system of two
equations in two unknowns (v, µ) that is amenable to analysis. We state the following:
Proposition 1: If the market structure in the quality goods sector is a monopoly, there exists a
unique steady state equilibrium characterized by positive wealth level v, research intensity µ and
positive growth rate g. (Proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 2: An increase in the degree of inequality, as measured by an increase in the spread
x, is harmful for innovative activity µ and the economy growth rate g. (Proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 says that under a monopolistic structure in the market for quality goods, a
unique steady state equilibrium can be reached (provided the condition given in the appendix is
satisfied) which is characterized by positive rates of innovative research and growth. The
graphical representation of proposition 1 is given in Figure 1. In the latter, the line termed (A')
represents the locus of points (v, µ) such that the expected value of an innovation is equal to its
costs (equation (43)). To understand why this line has a positive slope, notice that higher values
of research intensity µ shorten the useful duration of a quality product as innovations occur at a
faster pace. On the other hand, a larger wealth v guarantees a higher profitability for a product of
top quality because it increases consumers' willingness to pay for higher quality. Therefore, for
equation (43) to remain in equilibrium, higher values of µ must be matched by higher values of
v, so that the loss of profit due to a shorter useful life is offset by the higher profitability
guaranteed by a higher v. The line termed (L') represents the locus of points (v, µ) such that the
labor markets clear (equation (44)). This line has a negative slope because higher innovative
activity µ results in more demand for labor in the research sector. Since labor supply is fixed at
L, for labor markets to clear this increase in labor demand must be offset by a drop in labor
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demand in the manufacturing sector, either for producing the quality good or the homogeneous
good. Since labor demand for the quality good is fixed at cL, labor demand for producing the
homogeneous good must come down. The latter can occur if less of the homogeneous good is
consumed, which is ensured by lower values of wealth v. Proposition 2 is a comparative statics
result: it looks at the effect of an exogenous increase in the degree of inequality x on the rate of
research  and the rate of growth g. Both effects are found to be negative. The intuition that lies?
behind this result is that, as inequality increases, the monopolist of the highest quality starts
being under more pressure which stems from threat of a new entry in the market for quality
goods by a product of lower quality. This pressure can be thought of as stronger potential
competition which translates into decreasing expected returns for future incumbent monopolists
and reduced incentives to conduct innovative research. A drop in the latter also results in a fall in
the economic growth rate, as it can be seen with a glance at equation (42). Proposition 2 is
pictorially explained in the graph of Figure (2).  Notice that an increase in the degree of
inequality x causes both line (A') and line (L') to shift to their left. The shift is such that at the
new equilibrium, the level of wealth v is unchanged while innovative activity µ drops 
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Figure 1 - Monopoly Equilibrium
Figure 2 - Monopoly, Comparative Statics: Increase in Wealth Inequality
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7 Steady State Analysis - Duopoly
In equilibrium, the two equations that define the model under duopoly are8:
      (46)wa = ?2(v)? + ? + ??1(v)(? + ?)2
(47)?wa = ?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?v
Where the two expressions for profits are as follows:
(48)
?1e(v) = (? − 1)?
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3?
2
2x
?2e(v) = ? − 1? ?
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
2
2x
In the above, the two endogenous variables are µ, which denotes intensity of research,
and v, which measures the total value of wealth (other than wage income w). Of great importance
in our analysis will also be x, a measure of the spread of the distribution of v. The equilibrium
analysis is at first carried out for fixed spread x. Later we shall let it vary and measure the impact
of such variation on the endogenous pair (µ, v) in the new steady state equilibrium.
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8  Equation (43) is exactly as derived in the RnD section, whereas equation (44) is as derived from the labor
markets section, with , and after multiplying through by w.Cm = w + ? vL
Proposition 3: If the market structure in the quality goods sector is a duopoly, there exists a
unique steady state equilibrium characterized by positive wealth level v, research intensity µ and
positive growth rate g, provided that parameter values are such that the functions  and v = vA(?)
 implicitly defined by the schedules (46) and (47) satisfy the condition .v = vL(?) vA(?) < vL(?)
We sketch the proof of proposition 3 here, while the entire proof can be found in the
appendix.
Proof: this follows the same methodology that we used to prove proposition 1 regarding
monopoly. We note that both (46) and (47) implicitly define functions  and .v = vA(?) v = vL(?)
Our proof is in three steps: 1) prove that the function has positive slope for all , v = vA(?) ? m 0
.v m 0
2) prove that the function  has negative slope for all , . This condition  holds,v = vL(?) ? m 0 v m 0
provided that the leap in quality brought about by the latest innovation, as measured by γ, is
sufficiently small (in particular, the slope is negative for  ). 1 < ? < 2
3) Compute  and and notice that a unique equilibrium exists if and only if vA(?) x?=0 vL(?) x?=0
. In words, this latest step consists of showing that the vertical interceptvA(?) x?=0 < vL(?) x?=0
of the function defined by the (46) schedule occurs at a lower point than the vertical intercept of
the function defined by the (47) schedule. This fact, together with steps 1 and 2 ensures that the
two schedules meet only once in the positive quadrant of the (µ, v) plane and thereby determine  
a unique and positive pair (µ, v).
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The unique equilibrium of proposition 3 can be represented in a graph that looks like that
of Figure 1. This is done in Figure 3. In this graph, line A shows the set of paired values (µ, v)
for which, under duopoly, the expected value of innovation is equal to its cost. The economic
reasoning for the positive slope of A is very similar to that of the positive slope of line A' in
Figure 1 and it is not repeated here.
Similarly, the reasoning behind the downward slope of line L, which is the locus of all
paired values (µ, v) so that the labor markets clear under duopoly, is the same as that provided to
justify the negative slope of line L' in figure 1. Finally, you will notice that Figure 3, unlike
Figure 1, does not feature linear schedules, since the slopes of the lines in Figure 1 are constant,
while those of the lines of Figure 3 are not (see the calculations in the Appendix).
In order to obtain further insight and an easy way to perform comparative statics with
respect to inequality, we merge equations (46) and (47). Such a calculation yields the following
relationship between µ and v:
(49)? = ?1(v) = ?2(v) − aw?2aw − v
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Figure 3 - Duopoly Equilibrium
Notice that, upon dividing equation (47) through by aw, the latter also provides a direct
relationship between µ and v:
(50)? = ?2(v) = ?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?vaw
Equations (49) and (50) are shown in Figure 4 as lines (*) and (**), which yield another
way of looking at the steady state equilibrium under duopoly. We have already seen, earlier on in
the text, that under monopoly, the value of wealth is given by  Under duopoly, thev = wa
remaining value of the good that is second best must be added to the value of the latest
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µ
v
A
L
innovation, so that the value of wealth falls in the range . Therefore, we want towa < v < 2aw
study the behavior (49) and (50) for values of v falling into this range. Starting with (49), notice
that the latter has a vertical asymptote at v = 2aw. For v < 2aw, µ approaches +∞ as v
approaches 2aw from below, provided that . The latter can be ensured for?2(v) − aw? > 0
example by taking L to be sufficiently large. For , µ is a monotonically increasingaw [ v < 2aw
function of v, because   in the numerator is monotonically increasing in v, and the?2(v)
denominator goes down as v rises. Figure 4 illustrates the case described. As for line (**),
corresponding  to equation (50), its slope is given by the sign of the expression   .Ø?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv − ?
In the proof of proposition 3, to be found in the appendix, it is shown that a sufficient condition
for    and for (49) to have a negative slope, is that   . The two curvesØ?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv − ? < 0 1 < ? < 2
will meet once if and only if :
    (51)?1(aw) = ?2(aw) − aw?aw < ?2(aw) = ?2(aw) + ?1(aw) − aw?aw w ?1(aw)aw > 0
Further, in order to ensure that at the point of intersection , we need that either ? > 0
 on the schedule (49), or that  on the schedule (50).?2(aw) − aw? > 0 ?2(aw) +?1(aw) − ?v > 0
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Figure 4 - Duopoly Equilibrium, Alternative Representation
The curves (49) and (50) are also a useful and very simple tool to study how the
endogenous variable µ, and thereby the growth rate g, respond to changes in the degree of
inequality x.  
Proposition 4: Under duopoly, an increase in the degree of inequality x raises the intensity of
research µ and thereby the growth rate g. 
Proof: Since both in (49) and in (50) inequality x only enters the two profit functions, which in
turn enter  and  with a positive sign, it is sufficient to show that  and  .?1(v) ?2(v) Ø?1Øx > 0
Ø?2
Øx > 0
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v
µ
2 a waw
(*)
( * * )
We find   andØ?1
Øx = (? − 1)?
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3? x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
2x2
. Both   and    followØ?2
Øx =
? − 1
? ?
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3? x −
v
3 −
wL(1 − c)
3?
2x2
Ø?1
Øx > 0
Ø?2
Øx > 0
from the fact that x, under duopoly, must satisfy the condition  .x > v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
Proposition 4 tells us that duopoly yields a result with respect to changes in income
inequality that is the opposite of that obtained under monopoly (see proposition 2). The
economic argument is that when the market for quality goods is segmented, rising inequality in
wealth weakens competition among qualities, as the incumbent in each segment is able to
command a higher price because of the lower threat that consumers in the tails of each segment
might turn to the other quality. In the next section we take another look at how inequality in
wealth and the number of qualities in the market for quality goods interact. 
8 Comparative Statics on the Number of Qualities as a Function of Inequality,
Given Low or High Wages, and as a Function of Wages, Given Low or High
Inequality
In this section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to study how the number of
qualities in the product markets and hence the structure of the product markets react to changes
in wealth inequality x, and to changes in labour income, w. In order to study the behaviour of the
threshold levels of inequality and wages that determine the switch from monopoly to duopoly
(from one quality to two qualities), the relevant regime to look at is monopoly (this of course
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implies that duopoly would be the relevant regime if we were to study the threshold between two
and three qualities). This observation enables us to use the following feature of the monopoly
regime and greatly simplify the analysis: under monopoly, other wealth v is equal to the value of
the current innovation, V. In order to understand why this should be so, recall that wealth other
than wage income stems solely from holding shares in innovating firms. Since innovators’ tenure
under monopoly lasts for the current period only, the value of such firms coincides with the
value of the current innovation V. This in turn is equal to wa because of the free entry into RnD
condition (see equation 31). Therefore we can write: v = wa. Notice that the equilibrium v in
monopoly depends positively on wages, but does not depend on inequality x. We recall (see
equation 22) that the threshold level of inequality that determines the passage from a monopoly
of the highest quality to a duopoly of two qualities is9:
 (52)x& [ 13 v(w) +
wL(1 − c)
?
We can see that:
 (53)x&(wL) < x&(wH)
Where  and  are low wages and high wages, respectively. This situation is represented inwL wH
Figure 5. We can see that for low wages, the switch occurs at a lower level of inequality. When
wages are high, monopoly can persist even for relatively high level of inequality.
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9  In this section, the superscript “*” indicates equilibrium values of the variable concerned, while the subscripts
“L” and “H” stand for “low” and “high”.
In terms of wages, the threshold level is obtained simply by rearranging equation (52) to
get:
  (54)w& m ?L(1 − c) (3x − v(w& )) w w& m
3?x
L(1 − c) + a?
Here, as x increases, there is only a direct effect on w*, because the equilibrium v does not
depend on x in monopoly. Thus we have:
 (55)w&(xL) < w&(xH)
This situation is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 5 - n = f(x/w) - Extension of Tenure by n = 1 Due to a Higher w
Figure 6 - n=f(w/x) Extension of Tenure by n = 2 Due to a Higher x
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We see there that, when inequality is low, an exogenous rise in wages produces the
switch from two qualities to one. When inequality is high, a larger rise in wages is needed for a
switch from two qualities to one to take place. 
This model would explain why countries were inequality is rather high, but so too are
wages (like the U.S.) are characterized by a monopoly of the quality good markets, while some
less unequal societies, which also have a lower wage, have duopoly in the markets for quality
goods (we may think of Eastern Europe or China). 
9 The Case of Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods: a Numerical Example
At this point we construe a numerical example based on the system of equations (49) and (50)
which are repeated below for convenience:
(56)? = ?1(v) = ?2(v) − aw?2aw − v
(57)? = ?2(v) = ?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?vaw
This example may be of interest per se and it may contribute to giving a clearer
illustration of the workings of the model. First, we need to calibrate the set of exogenous
parameters {w, a, ρ, c, L, γ, x}. Although most of these parameters have been explained when
they were first introduced, as a matter of convenience, they will be defined again here as they are
assigned the calibrated values. The first parameter to be calibrated is the income from labor, w,
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which, as you may recall, had been assumed to be equal for everybody. For simplicity, we set w
= 1. Then we have the labor coefficient in the research sector, a. There is not an immediately
available criterion upon which to base the calibration of this parameter. It should be said,
however, that in duopoly the product aw constitutes  the lower bound for the value of total other
wealth v, hence, given the value assigned to w, it seems reasonable to assign a value greater than
1 to the research labor coefficient a. We settle for a = 10. As for the next parameter, the rate of
time preference, ρ, it is generally believed to be the same as the long term real interest rate. We
think that a reasonable figure for the latter is  ρ = 0.03. Table 1 below and Fig. 7 are constructed
on the basis of this value for ρ. In Fig. 8, the entire numerical example is re-run after setting ρ =
0.05. This is done in order to check that the graphical output in its substance is not sensitive to
small changes in the value of . The case with  has the additional advantage of yielding? ? = 0.05
graphs that are more clearcut. Another parameter to be calibrated is c, the labor coefficient in
manufacturing the quality good, which should be assigned a value less than 1. This is in order to
avoid that the labor coefficient in all sectors other than manufacturing the quality good, 1-c,
turns negative, which would make no sense. Among all the possible values in the interval [0,1],
we decided to pick c = 0.7. We now come to L, the labor force. Perhaps for this parameter, more
than for any other, just any value would do. Here we take into account the fact that the product
wL, the total wage that the population L is able to earn from labor, should not have a very
different order of magnitude than the value of total wealth other than wage income v. The
product wa can be thought of as a first approximation for v, since it constitutes its lower bound.
In order to have the two quantities v and wL not to be of very different scales, we set L = 10. 
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Having calibrated the subset of exogenous parameters {w, a, ρ, c, L}, our strategy is to
use the remaining two exogenous variables γ and x to study how the model responds to
exogenous shocks. 
The choice of γ, which measures the size of the technological leap that occurs with the
arrival of a new higher quality product, is motivated by the fact that γ represents the size of the
technological advantage that the technological leader has on her closest rival. As such, γ is a very
important parameter in determining the incentive to innovate. It is reasonable to expect that,
when everything else is held constant, the bigger the technological advantage, the higher will be
the rate of innovative activity µ in equilibrium. We imagine two different settings: the first,
termed "economy with small technological leaps" is characterized by a  . The second,? = 1.3
which we call "economy with big technological leaps" is characterized by a  . Finally, we? = 2
need to calibrate x, the inequality parameter, in such a way that enables us to study the behavior
of the economy as x changes exogenously, in a meaningful way. In order to do so, we have to
recall that our aim with the present numerical example is to illustrate how the model works under
duopoly. For duopoly to obtain in equilibrium, we must choose a value of x that satisfies the
complement to condition (22), as stated in footnote 3, as reported below:
(58)x > 13 v +
wL(1 − c)
?
Given the values assigned to the parameters so far, this is equivalent to ensuring that 
. Furthermore, to ensure that equation (49) is positivelyx > 13 10 +
10(1 − 0.7)
0.05 w x > 23.33
sloped, the numerator of the right hand side of that equation must be positive, which occurs if  
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. We consider two different scenarios. In the first, which we call "low inequalityx > 60
economy", we set x = 70. In the second, termed "high inequality economy", we set x = 100. To
recap, given the way we have also classified the possibilities according to different values of γ,
we end up with four different possible scenarios: a small leap, low inequality economy; a small
leap, high inequality economy; a big leap, low inequality economy; and a big leap, high
inequality economy. The following table describes the equilibrium values of the variables
"wealth other than wage income", v, and "rate of innovative activity", µ, in these four different
situations:
Table 1 - Equilibrium values of v and µ in the four states of the economy, given the following
values for the remaining exogenous parameters:: w = 1; a = 10, ρ = 0.03; c = 0.7;   L =10  
1.421.230.650.57π2(v)
0.580.230.180.07π1(v)
0.1610.1110.0650.03µ
1311.6112.3211.15v
big leap high
inequality
γ=2, x=100
big leap low
inequality
γ=2, x=70
small leap high
inequality 
γ=1.3, x=100
small leap, low
inequality
 γ=1.3, x=70
The four possible states of the economy
The same results can also be viewed in the four panels of Figures 7 and 8, for the two
cases that  and , respectively. As expected and as predicted by the theory, as? = 0.3 ? = 0.5
inequality increases, in duopoly we observe a rise in the rate of research intensity µ (this is
proposition 4 of Section 7). The latter also increases when the technological advantage held by
the top-quality is bigger (i.e., when the distance γ between steps on the quality ladder is larger).
The economic argument on which proposition 4 rests is that in a segmented, duopolistic market
for quality goods, rising income inequality segments that market even further in such a way that
the incumbents in the respective segments can enjoy more market power, because of weaker
competition from the other segment. There derives an ability to extract higher rents which
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motivates people who work in the research lab to increase their innovation effort. Such larger
innovation intensity results in faster technical progress and higher rates of growth for the
economy. As for the fact that innovation intensity µ and growth rate g are also increasing in the
distance between steps on the quality ladder, γ, this depends on the fact that the profit function
for the producer of the top quality good increases in γ. The higher profitability of the top quality
product results in a higher µ through the usual incentive mechanism. It is interesting to notice
that, given the structure of the growth equation (42), an increase in γ raises g both directly,
because it explicitly appears in (42), and indirectly, through the increase in the innovation  
intensity µ.
Given the relationship between the rate of research intensity µ and the rate of economic
growth g, as described in equation (42), it is possible to conclude that, as shown by this
numerical example and in line with proposition 4, as the degree of income inequality increases,
the rate of growth of such an economy should rise.
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Figure 7 - A Numerical Example with Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods. The Case with 
? = 0.3
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Figure 8 - A Numerical Example with Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods. The Case with 
? = 0.5
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10 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a quality ladder model characterized by non homothetic consumer
preferences, in line with the vertical quality differentiation literature. Such modeling of
consumer preferences in the context of a quality ladder model is the novel element of this study,
and it is an attempt to explain real world phenomena like the survival of older generations of
goods along with the state-of-the-art, something which was not accounted for in the mainstream
quality ladder models of Grossman et al. (1991) and Aghion et al. (1992).
The next step in this line of research might be to introduce such preferences in open
economy quality ladder models, such as that of Grossman et al.(1991, chp.12). Indeed, in an
open economy framework, the possibility of having monopoly of the best quality in a richer
North with a higher and less unequal distribution of wealth, and duopoly in a poorer South with a
lower and more widespread distribution of wealth, might be obtained as an endogenous outcome
of the model. 
Such a model would then make it possible to study equilibrium outcomes and
comparative statics involving changes in the spread of the wealth distribution, much like has
been done in the closed economy model developed in the present chapter.
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Appendix A.1
Proof of proposition 1:
We plug monopoly profits into equations (43) and (44) so to have them in explicit form:
(43)wa =
? − 1
? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
? + ?
(44)w?a = ? − 1? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − ?v
It is useful to rewrite (43) and (44) as follows:
(A.1)
A∏(?, v) = 0 w ? − 1? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa(? + ?) = 0
L∏(?, v) = 0 w ? − 1? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − ?v − w?a = 0
Proof of proposition 1 will be done in three steps:
Step 1: we shall prove that   ,dvd? xA∏ > 0
Step 2: we shall prove that   ,dvd? xL∏ < 0
Step 3: we shall write down the condition under which  .vA∏(?) x?=0 < vL∏(?) x?=0
In step 1:
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 (A.2)dvd? xA∏ = −
−wa
? − 1
? ?
> 0
In step 2:
  (A.3)dvd? xL∏ = − −wa− 1? ?
< 0
In step 3: to compute we set  in (A.1) and solve for v:vA∏(?) x?=0 ? = 0
(A.4)
? − 1
? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa? = 0 w vA∏(?) x?=0 = x + ?? − 1 wa −
wL(1 − c)
?
We compute in the same way: vL∏(?) x?=0
(A.5)
? − 1
? [?(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − ?v = 0 w vL∏(?) x?=0 = (? − 1) wL(1 − c)? − x
A unique equilibrium with a positive pair (v, µ) exists if and only if:
. (A.6)x + ?? − 1 wa −
wL(1 − c)
? < (? − 1) wL(1 − c)? − x w x < wL(1 − c)? − 1? − 1 wa
Proof of Proposition 2:  This proposition can be proved in two ways. 
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Proof 1: an increase in inequality x, as measured by:   , and by: 
Ø?
Øx xA∏ = −
− ? − 1? ?−wa < 0
 , moves to the left both the (43) and the (44) schedule. As a result, we
Ø?
Øx xL∏ = −
− ? − 1? ?−wa < 0
have a new equilibrium with less research intensity µ and growth g (recall that  ).g = ? ln?
Furthermore, since the effect of an increase in x on both schedules is of the same magnitude, at
the new equilibrium, the level of other wealth v is unchanged.
Proof 2: In a monopoly equilibrium, the value of other wealth v is determined by the value of the
most recent innovation. As shown in the text, the latter is equal to the costs faced by the most
recent innovator: v = wa . We plug this result into (43) and (44), to get the same relationship:
(43, 44)
? − 1
? [?(wa − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa(? + ?) = 0
We then solve for µ to get:
(A.7)? = ? − 1? L(1 − c)a − ?xwa − 1? ?
From the above it is obvious that µ decreases in x.
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The proof is done in three steps. Schedules (46) and (47) implicitly define functions  v = vA(?)
and  .v = vL(?)
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Step 1: prove that   .dvd? xA > 0
Rewrite (46) as follows:
(A.8)G(?, v) = 0 w −wa + ?2(v)? + ? + ??1(v)(? + ?)2 = 0
Then, by the implicit function theorem: 
 (A.9) dvd? xA = −
ØG
Ø?
ØG
Øv
 
We find that 
 (A.10) ØG
Ø? = −
?2
(? + ?)2 −
?1(? − ?)
(? + ?)3
We set  and solve for µ to get   . Notice that, in duopoly,   since  ØG
Ø? = 0 ? = ?
?1 − ?2?1 + ?2 ? < 0
 . ?1 < ?2
As   for  and as we are only interested in non-negative values of µ, we conclude thatØG
Ø? < 0 ? > ?
 in the relevant range. ØG
Ø? < 0
Next, we compute
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 (A.11) ØG
Øv =
Ø?2
Øv? + ? +
? Ø?1
Øv
(? + ?)2 =
1? + ? Ø?2Øv +
? Ø?1
Øv? + ?
which takes the sign of  Ø?2
Øv +
? Ø?1
Øv? + ?
We find that 
(A.12) Ø?2
Øv =
? − 1
? ?
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
3x > 0
and
 (A.13)Ø?1
Øv = (? − 1)?
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3?
x − 13 < 0
However
 (A.14)   Ø?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv = x +
v
3 +
wL(1 − c)
3? + ? x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3? > 0
in duopoly, as the expression in brackets is guaranteed to be positive with such a market
structure. 
 follows from   Hence  . The latter enables us to conclude that Ø?2
Øv +
? Ø?1
Øv? + ? > 0 ?? + ? < 1 ØGØv > 0
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(A.15)dvd? xA = −
ØG
Ø? < 0
ØG
Øv > 0
> 0
 
Step 2: prove that   dvd? xL < 0
Rewrite (47) as 
 (A.16)H(?, v) = 0 w ?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?v? − wa = 0
By the implicit function theorem:    dvd? xL = −
ØH
Ø?
ØH
Øv
First, we compute   ØH
Ø? = −
?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?v
?2
  follows from   (see (47)). ØH
Ø? < 0 ?2(v) + ?1(v) − ?v = ?wa > 0
Next, we compute  ØH
Øv =
Ø?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv − ??
We need to determine the sign of    Ø?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv − ?
A few calculations reveal that
(A.17)Ø?2
Øv +
Ø?1
Øv − ? < 0
provided that
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 (A.18)x > 1 − ?2 − ?
v
3 +
wL(1 − c)
3?
Since x is always positive, this condition certainly holds if its RHS is negative. That is indeed the
case if  . 1 < ? < 2
Then we have that   . ØH
Øv < 0
Therefore, we conclude that for  ,1 < ? < 2
 (A.19)dvd? xL = −
ØH
Ø? < 0
ØH
Øv < 0
< 0
Step 3: a unique equilibrium with a positive pair (µ, v) and a positive growth rate g exists if and
only if 
(A.20)vA(?) x?=0 < vL(?) x?=0
Where
 (A.21)vA(?) x?=0 = 3 wa ?? − 1 2x
1
2 − 3x − wL(1 − c)?
and  is implicitly determined in (47) with . vL(?) x?=0 ? = 0
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Appendix A.2 - List of symbols
 = outputY
 = technologyA
 = intermediate input to production (quantity)x
 = consumption indexD
 = quality goodq
 = quality indexi = {1, 2}
 = incomeI
 = price of a good of quality pi i
 = populationL
 = distance between two steps on the quality ladder?
 = homogeneous, composite goodh
 = utility in period ut t
 = interest rate at time trt
 = rate of time preference?
 = assetsk
 = wagew
 = consumptionC
 = index of consumption patterns, where l is poorest, eq is equilibrium, m isj = {l, .., eq, .., m, .., u}
mean, and u is richest consumption pattern respectively
 = total wealth, defined as  v ku+kl2 L
 = spread in wealth, defined as  x ku−kl2 L
 = demand for good of quality iDi
 = cumulative distribution function of consumption patternsF($)
 = density function of consumption patternsf($)
 = profit accruing to firm producing good of quality i?i
= labor coefficient in manufacturing sectorc
 (superscript) = indicates an equilibrium quantitye
 (subscript) = indicates monopolyM
 (superscript) = indicates next periodn
 = arrival rate of innovations, innovation intensity?
 = value of an innovationV
 = labor coefficient in the research sectora
 (subscript) = indicates that subscripted symbol refers to the research sectorA
In section 3.8:
 = number of qualitiesn
 (subscript) = low qualityL
 (subscript) = high qualityH
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